

Chapter 7

Protests and Leadership Turnover after Authoritarian Elections

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(8,984 words)

Since the end of the Cold War, growing pressure from the international community has made it difficult for authoritarian leaders to avoid holding periodical elections. Coinciding with the proliferation of autocracies with elections (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010),ⁱⁱ scholars of authoritarian politics began to draw their attention to elections' role in authoritarian regimes, asserting that authoritarian leaders may use elections as a tool to consolidate their rule (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Blaydes 2011). However, the more puzzling fact about autocratic elections is that elections do not always benefit autocrats to the extent some research suggests. Rather, elections often induce more political conflicts like popular protests that undermine authoritarian stability. For example, the color revolutions in post-Soviet countries (Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan) during the mid-2000s all occurred immediately after elections (Tucker 2007; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2010). Likewise after the Côte d'Ivoire 2000 elections, massive protests erupted in favor of opposition parties, which subsequently ousted the incumbent president Robert Guéï. Protests allow the opposition to send a clear signal of public dissent to the international community. Thus, even if subdued by dictatorial governments, the eruption of serious protests may threaten authoritarian stability in the long run, with international actors tightening economic sanctions and adopting coercive diplomacy.

Another form of unexpected post-electoral political change is leadership turnover as a result of elections producing surprising results for the incumbent leader. For instance, unpopular incumbent Prime Minister Bandaranaike lost the Sri Lankan 1977 elections by the largest margin in the country's history to increasingly popular opposition parties. This resulted in not only the opposition's electoral victory but also the strengthening of Tamil opposition people's sentiment toward separatism (Samaraweera 1977, 1201), which helped contribute to the Sri Lankan Civil War. Similarly, in December 1991, the Algerian President, Chadli Bendjedid called the first multi-party election in Algeria's history. This election also unexpectedly brought a sweeping victory to the radical Islamic Salvation Front opposition party, triggering a military coup and a civil war (Bouandel 1993). Separately, in the 1989 Polish elections, the opposition Solidarity Movement obtained an overwhelming majority both in the lower and upper houses, paving the way for a democratic transition. "No one in the political elite anticipated the replacement of a Communist government by a Solidarity government (...) The purpose of (...) election procedures was to permit Solidarity to enter Parliament but to preserve the continuation of Communist rule" (Olson 1993, 417).

Cross-national dataⁱⁱⁱ on 72 authoritarian countries (1975-2004) shows that a small but significant minority of authoritarian leaders faces either political turnover or popular protests after elections: 14% of authoritarian elections experienced leadership turnover, whereas popular protests occurred in 19% of them. Political leaders in dictatorships like Indonesia (1997), Cameroon (1993), Azerbaijan (2000, 2003), and Mexico (1988, 1994) experienced post-election popular protests, while Uruguay (1984), Bolivia (1980), Chile (1988), Haiti (1995, 2000), Sri Lanka (1977) and Liberia (1997) saw their elections lead to political turnover. These variations in post-electoral outcomes in authoritarian states leave us with several puzzles: why do authoritarian elections, which are expected to help autocrats to stay in power, often backfire? Specifically, why do autocrats face two different types of threats—popular protests and political turnover—after elections and how can we understand the sources of these two distinct political conflicts in dictatorship?

In untangling the puzzling relationships among protests, turnover and authoritarian elections, this chapter suggests an answer: authoritarian leaders likely face either protests or overthrow when they fail to successfully manipulate elections in light of their mobilization power. To do so, I first describe the dilemma that political leaders face at the ballot box. Recent literature on authoritarian politics suggests that autocrats try to take advantage of elections to show their invincibility as well as obtain information on key actors' strengths (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2006; Cox 2009; Blaydes 2010; Simpson 2013). To achieve these ends, elections need to be free and fair enough to make the results believable. On the one hand, if election results are seen to be completely predetermined, then authoritarian leaders cannot enjoy the informational benefits of a more competitive election. On the other hand, if elections are too free and fair, it is more likely that autocrats fail to win overwhelmingly. In other words, autocrats face a serious trade-off (which this chapter calls "the electoral dilemma" in authoritarian regimes) between the credibility of election results and the certainty of winning big. Under the constraint of this dilemma, authoritarian leaders need to carefully make a decision about how much they should manipulate elections.

To what extent authoritarian leaders open up the electoral field given the constraints of this electoral dilemma will be determined by their ability to mobilize voluntary popular support from citizens, or autocrats' mobilization power (Higashijima 2013). When the political leader is able to buy a large portion of popular support through extensive pre-electoral economic distributions, she will be able to win big without relying much on the tools of electoral fraud such as election violence, electoral cheating and manipulation of electoral law. Thus, if the autocrat is financially strong, the more credibly she is able to signal her strength by producing an overwhelming majority at the polls without making the electoral field extremely favorable to herself. By contrast, when the authoritarian leader lacks of such financial resources, she is unable to organize large-scale mobilization of popular support. In this case, fair elections are more likely to produce surprising results, so that the authoritarian leader has a strong interest in biasing election results by engaging in electoral manipulation.

If authoritarian leaders are able to overcome this electoral dilemma by optimally setting the level of electoral fraud according to their mobilization power, then elections contribute to authoritarian stability via the signaling and information-gathering functions. The more complicated fact, however, is that autocrats may have difficulties in setting the appropriate level of electoral fraud in light of their power. When this is the case, autocrats fail to solve the electoral dilemma, and they are more likely to face political conflict after elections – popular protests or political turnover. More specifically, I argue that there are two distinct pathways through which authoritarian elections induce political conflict. First, when autocrats underuse electoral fraud relative to their power, election results are more likely to credibly reveal the weakness. This brings about leadership change as a result of post-electoral coups within ruling coalitions or via opposition parties' electoral victory. Second, when autocrats overuse electoral fraud relative to their power of mobilization, elections deteriorate the quality of electoral information and hence cannot work as a credible tool to show regime strength. This encourages post-electoral protest movements.

In order to test these empirical implications derived from my theory of authoritarian elections (Higashijima 2013), I conduct a cross-national statistical analysis including 72 authoritarian countries between 1975-2004. I employ a two-stage estimation to test my theoretical expectations. I first run a model in which I predict the level of electoral fraud using a series of regressors measuring mobilization power of authoritarian leaders and other controls that are found to be important to explain electoral fraud in the previous literature. Then, using predicted values in the first-stage model, I measure differences between the predicted level of electoral fraud that the autocrat is expected to employ in light of her strength and the real level of electoral fraud that he actually exercised in the election. In doing so, it is possible to empirically observe how well the autocrat dealt with the electoral dilemma. Then, in the second-stage model, I estimate the likelihoods of leadership turnover and popular protests using probit regressions with this fraud gap variable. My empirical analysis shows that the more negative the gap variable is, the more likely elections are to bring leadership turnover, suggesting that the autocrat's underuse of electoral fraud is more likely to lead to leadership change. By contrast, when the gap variable takes positive values signifying that the autocrat overuses electoral fraud, the elections are more likely to be followed by popular protests.

Literature Review

The extant literature of authoritarian politics contends that formal institutions play crucial roles in consolidating authoritarian rule. Since dominant parties institutionalize their patronage system and enable the autocrat to make credible commitment to the internal elite, party regimes are more likely to survive than military and personalist regimes (Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2008). Multi-party legislatures also increase autocrats' survival rate because it provides a forum through which autocrats can make policy concession to a large portion of society (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008),

credibly share patronage with the elite (Malesky and Schuler 2010; Blaydes 2011; Boix and Svobik 2011), and divide and rule opposition parties (Lust-Okar 2004). For similar reasons, multi-party legislatures also make political order stable by preventing civil war and labor protests (Vreeland and Gandhi 2004; Kim and Gandhi 2010).

Among these institutions, elections have been seen as one of the most important political tools that autocrats can use to stay in power (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Blaydes 2011). First, autocratic elections are viewed as an institution for authoritarian leaders to *acquire* information on competence of ruling and opposition elites. Semi-competitive elections provide information on the popularity of local officials and candidates in their electoral districts (Ames 1970; Shi 1999; Magaloni 2006). The total number of votes that candidates gain in their districts works as an opportunity for autocrats to judge who among the elites is powerful as well as who is loyal to the dictator (Blaydes 2011). Election results also render information on the geographical distribution of popular support for opposition parties (Magaloni 2006; Cox 2009; Miller 2012). Second, elections work as an efficient method to communicate with the elites by *conveying information* on regime strengths. By holding elections and winning them with a large-margin, autocrats can credibly demonstrate to potential opponents that the regime is so unshakable that any rebellious attempt against the current ruler will fail (Simpser 2013; Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2006).

The current literature of authoritarian politics tends to focus on how elections help autocrats stay in power. Other strands of research, on the other hand, have suggested that elections in hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes often contribute to democratization. Lindberg (2006, 2009) argue that repetitive elections in multi-party contexts contribute to further democratization and improve the quality of democracy in Africa. Employing a comprehensive cross-national dataset covering 193 countries between 1919-2004, Teorrel and Hadenius (2009) find both current and cumulative effects of holding elections on democratization, which resonates with Lindberg's finding in the context of Africa. In a similar vein, Roessler and Howard (2009) and Brownlee (2009) assert that competitive authoritarian regimes are more likely to democratize than both hegemonic and closed authoritarian regimes. In this context, Huntington (1991: 174), notes that "the lessons of the third wave [of democratization] is that elections are not only the life of democracy; they are also the death of dictatorship."

In a similar vein, researchers also maintain that fraudulent elections provide an opportunity for opposition parties and anti-regime supporters to protest (Tucker 2007; Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009). Although most protests are repressively subdued, some post-electoral manifestations of public dissent include large scale, anti-government demonstrations. In some cases, these demonstrations lead to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, which has occurred in the Philippines (1986), the post-Soviet countries (the color revolutions, Tucker 2007; Thompson and Kuntz 2009), and Côte d'Ivoire (2000).

In reconciling these different findings about authoritarian elections, scholars have begun to illuminate the background conditions determining authoritarian elections' effects on democratization, leadership change and protest movements. Conducting both a cross-national quantitative analysis of 31 competitive authoritarian countries and a Kenyan case study, Howard and Roessler (2006) find that election results tend to become more open when opposition parties succeed in forming coalitions and launching pre-election anti-government protests. Donno (2013) also asserts that competitive authoritarian states are more likely to democratize either when domestic oppositions form coalitions or when pre-electoral political and economic conditionality is imposed from international actors. In a study on electoral violence in developing countries, Hafner-Burton et al. (2013) provide cross-national evidence that serious pre-electoral violence is positively associated with the probability of post-electoral protests. Similarly, Kuhn (2012) shows that electoral fraud increases the propensity of popular protests after elections (only in fairly close elections however). And Bunce and Wolchik (2010) emphasize the importance of the opposition's electoral campaign strategies. They argue that in hybrid regimes where opposition parties can carry out sophisticated, energetic electoral campaigns elections are more likely to trigger both political protests and leadership turnover.

Echoing these previous studies, this chapter posits conditional hypotheses about authoritarian elections' effects on turnover and protests. This research, however, contributes to the literature in two different and original ways. First, taking into account the costs and benefits of authoritarian elections, this chapter theoretically and empirically endogenizes the authoritarian leader's electoral manipulation calculations. Assuming that autocrats will strategically decide on a level of electoral manipulation that maximizes the informational benefits, I argue that autocrats will likely face post-electoral conflicts such as leadership turnover and protests when they miscalculate on the extent of electoral fraud. Second, I explain both leadership turnover and popular protests in a unified theoretical framework. Briefly, I argue that popular protests and leadership turnover both result from different types of mistakes that autocrats make at the ballot box.

The Electoral Dilemma in Authoritarian Regimes

According to the recent literature on authoritarian politics, political leaders and their potential opponents are more likely to lack reliable informational sources to know each other's strength and intention (Wintrobe 1998; Egorov et al. 2009). Since political rights and civil liberties are not institutionalized in authoritarian regimes, people are difficult to know to what extent the political leader is able and popular through reliable media outlets. In such circumstances, potential opponents among people are less likely to accurately estimate the strength of the autocrat. Such misinformation may increase the likelihood that a conflict accidentally occurs between an autocrat and potential opponents. Strengthening the military is a frequently used strategy by which an autocrat can credibly demonstrate her power. Yet, history suggests that a heavy reliance on the

sword risks an autocrat's tenure by giving the military too much power (Svolik 2012). Therefore, strengthening the security apparatus is not a perfect solution.

On the other hand, the political leader also faces difficulties in knowing what people think in authoritarian regimes, because people have an incentive to conceal their preferences fearing tortures and repression by the government (Kuran 1991; Wintrobe 1998). This is problematic because if she is not familiar with the distribution of popular support, it is more difficult to govern the country efficiently. Strengthening domestic surveillance may be an available option to the autocrat. Yet such methods do not always garner high quality information, because in such situations people will falsify their true preferences in the public fearing possible sanctions by the government, as previous studies acutely pointed out (Wintrobe 1998).

Recent studies of authoritarian politics see elections as an important institution to overcome this information shortage. According to the current literature, authoritarian elections enable political leaders to (1) demonstrate their strength via large-scale electoral mobilization to potential opponents (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2006; Simpser 2013) and (2) acquire information on the distribution of popular support of both the opposition and incumbent politicians—both of whom may turn against the political leader (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Cox 2009; Blaydes 2010). When autocrats call elections, however, they face a serious trade-off between the certainty of gaining an overwhelming victory and the credibility of election results (Higashijima 2013). Authoritarian leaders can stay in power by winning through ballot stuffing, repression, intimidation, and the manipulation of election rules and institutions. Resorting to serious electoral manipulation, authoritarian leaders can effectively deter opposition parties from winning. Yet, at the same time, excessive electoral manipulation makes elections meaningless or even harmful to their authoritarian rule for two reasons. First, extremely pro-regime election results make it difficult for autocrats to convey a credible signal of their regime's strength to potential opponents because the more manipulated elections are, the less election results reflect the autocrat's real popularity. In such predetermined plebiscite elections, citizens tend to be indifferent or cynical about the electoral process and its results as in the Soviet Union (e.g. White 1988: 13; Tedin 1994). Therefore, the signaling effect of elections will be significantly reduced in heavily manipulated elections. The second problem is that if elections are just a façade, autocrats can no longer obtain accurate information about popularity of potential opponents among ruling elites and opposition leaders. Obviously, electoral manipulation biases election results in favor of the autocrat, so that election results will suffer non-negligible noises on electoral information. Deteriorated electoral information makes it very difficult for autocrats to maintain their authoritarian rule efficiently. This is because autocrats need to govern the country without reliable information that would have been obtained if the political system had been more transparent (Wintrobe 1998; Egorov et al. 2009).

Therefore, although which electoral benefits autocrats want to exploit the most might differ across countries, they all have incentives to open the electoral field and introduce some degree of competition via electoral reforms. This is what happened, for example, in the Soviet Union during the perestroika era (White 1988), in village-level elections in Communist China (Shi 1999), and in Mexico during the PRI's heyday (Eisenstadt 2004, 32-44). That being said, it does not necessarily mean that relatively free and fair elections are always good for autocrats. Given the strategic interactions between the autocrat and potential opponents under the electoral dilemma, if autocrats make elections too transparent, then they are more exposed to risks and may fail to obtain electoral victory with a large margin, thereby revealing their weaknesses. This may give an opportunity for potential opponents to challenge the political leader. On the other hand, excessive electoral manipulation deteriorates the information problems that I mentioned above, which makes efficient communication between the autocrat and opponents more difficult. Under the constraint of the electoral dilemma, autocrats need to decide the level of electoral manipulation while considering likely responses from potential opponents, in a way that autocrats can balance the credibility and the certainty of election results.

Backfiring at the Ballot Box

When an autocrat wins an election by an overwhelming margin, the total number of votes that she obtains consists of "clean" and "dirty" parts. The "clean" part is the total number of real votes from her supporters. These citizens vote for the dictator after positively evaluating her economic and policy performance. In particular, previous studies suggest that authoritarian leaders' popular support depends on the breadth their distribution of economic favors to the citizenry (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007, 2009). For example, non-tax revenues like natural resource wealth or foreign aid significantly enrich state coffers and thus enable increased public spending without having to levy taxes on their citizens (e.g., Ross 2001; Desai et al. 2009; Morrison 2009; Wight, Frantz and Geddes 2013). Even if state revenue is raised by taxation, autocrats can buttress public support by selectively collecting taxes from opposition loyalists and using it to benefit regime supporters, as is the case in many authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010, 10-11, Chapters 5-7). Gaining voluntary support is therefore costly because governments must invest large amounts of financial resources to satisfy their citizens. Therefore, an election victory upheld by costly mobilization of citizens' support makes election results credible to know the autocrat's strength and popularity. In this chapter, I refer to citizens' voluntary support for the political leader through economic and policy performance as the leader's "mobilization power."

The second, "dirty" part is the total number of votes resulting from various kinds of electoral manipulation. In this chapter, electoral fraud is defined as a series of illegal measures that bias election results in favor of the political leader (Lehoucq 2003), including election violence, election cheating, and undemocratic restrictions on electoral law. Election violence is physical intimidation exercised largely by incumbent parties

during elections (Straus and Taylor 2012; Hafner-Burton et al. 2012). Using electoral violence against opposition leaders and anti-regime supporters, autocrats can undermine oppositions' effective campaigns and decrease opposition supporters' turnout. Cheating also allows autocrats to affect the electoral result with nonviolent but still illegal measures such as undermining of oppositions' freedom to campaigns, media bias, ballot stuffing, vote-buying, and nonviolent intimidation (Kelley 2012). Restrictions on electoral laws refer to a series of regulations that prevent citizens and electoral candidates from effectively participating in elections, including limits on voting rights based on certain social characteristics such as gender and ethnicity, flaws in the complaints procedures, high thresholds for new parties to get registered and gain seats, constraints on the right to run for office such as language and educational requirements, and so on (Kelley 2012). All three fraud techniques, though different, contribute to an electoral victory with a margin that could not be achieved without these techniques.

Making full sense of her mobilization power, if the autocrat can tactfully match the level of electoral fraud with her strength, she can exploit as much informational benefit as possible while maintaining an overwhelming majority. When this is the case, elections contribute to authoritarian stability. In fact, authoritarian regimes with substantial financial resources and a weak opposition tend to have lower levels of electoral fraud (Higashijima 2013), suggesting that authoritarian leaders strategically manipulate elections based on their ability to cultivate voluntary popular support. When the autocrat fails to adequately deal with the electoral dilemma, the elections are more likely to backfire. More specifically, autocrats fail to deal with the electoral dilemma in two ways.

First, stability may not be achieved when authoritarian leaders are overconfident about their popularity, hold multi-party elections, and then lose a supermajority (or even an electoral victory). Researchers have provided substantial anecdotal evidence and noted that autocrats' overconfidence unexpectedly paves the way for democratization and leadership change—e.g. in Brazil (1974), Pinochet's Chile (1988), Marcos's Philippines (1986), Myanmar (1990) and Algeria (1992) (Huntington 1991: 174-178; Diamond 2008: 53-54). In Poland, for example, the authoritarian government held multi-party elections in 1989 without using serious electoral fraud. The incumbent government did not doubt its popularity, and the opposition Solidarity party also did not expect its eventual electoral triumph (Olson 1993, 425). Nevertheless, after the vote count, Solidarity scored a sweeping electoral victory, which resulted in Poland's transition to democracy. Algeria's 1991 election exhibited similar characteristics to Poland's; however, elections there did not result in democratization. Algeria's president did decide to hold multi-party elections with a free and fair electoral process. In the first round of elections, the opposition Islamic Salvation Front emerged victorious with 87.7% of the total seats decided (Bouandel 1993, 13). Fearing the rise of the radical Islamists, the army annulled the election results and removed the president from power in a military coup. This military intervention then led to the civil war between the government and Islamist rebel groups. These Polish and Algerian cases suggest that when an autocrat does not

increase electoral fraud up to the level that her de facto weakness demands, election results can credibly reveal her regime's true weakness to potential opponents and lead to a leadership change. Revealed weakness in an election is most likely to result in leadership turnover via electoral victory of opposition parties and hence democratization like the cases of Poland and Chile. Or like Côte d'Ivoire and Algeria, such dictator's weakness may encourage ruling coalitions to then change their leader via a military coup or civil war.

Hypothesis 1: When an autocrat underuses electoral fraud relative to her power, political turnover is more likely to occur after an election.

Second, autocrats may likely face another type of political conflict—popular protests—after they use excessive electoral fraud. When the autocrat excessively rigs elections, potential opponents are more likely to think that election results will be largely driven by political manipulation, rather than voluntary popular support. Therefore, the signals conveyed by the elections to potential opponents are more mixed when it comes to knowing an autocrat's true popularity and strength. In particular, previous studies suggest that “sticks” (blatant electoral fraud) without sufficient accompanying “carrots” (economic favors) encourages potential dissidents to speculate that the regime is now too weak to hold up its anti-regime collective action. As Bunce and Wolchik (2010, 38) put it, “while signals in the admittedly murky political environment of mixed regimes are always hard to read, repression can also be read as an indication that political leaders have become increasingly nervous about their hold on power.” In fact, various studies show that both harsh repression and excessive election cheating without much patronage distribution fuel the escalation of protests in authoritarian regimes. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Wood (2000) argue that African autocracies (when failing to provide goods to citizens) have faced anti-regime popular mobilization after adopting harsh state repression. Investigating the experiences of South Asian countries during the Cold War era, Goodwin (2001) also asserts that political revolution is more likely to occur in the countries where the government has relied on indiscriminate violence against anti-government forces. Color Revolutions in post-Soviet countries were all preceded by rigged elections (Tucker 2007). In the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan, violence perpetrated by state police and electoral fraud exercised by incumbents fueled opposition forces' grievances, which activated anti-regime mobilization against the Akayev regime (Jones 2007). Therefore, I hypothesize that after being exposed to excessive electoral fraud, anti-government popular protests are more likely to be observed.

Hypothesis 2: When an autocrat overuses electoral fraud relative to her power, post-election popular protests are more likely to occur.

Empirics

Data and Modeling Strategies

In order to empirically test the two hypotheses, I conduct a cross-national statistical analysis. The **unit of analysis** is country-election year in an authoritarian country between 1975-2004. I limit my sample to authoritarian countries using a binary classification of political regime by Cheibub et al. (2010), a frequently used dataset to identify authoritarian regimes in the literature.

To measure the gap between the degree of electoral fraud and the autocrat's mobilization power, I adopt a two-stage model. In the first-stage, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to regress a series of predictors on electoral fraud, which is continuously measured with values ranging between 0 (no fraud) and 15 (most fraudulent) from Kelley's (2012) Quality of Elections (QOE) Dataset. The electoral fraud variable includes five subcomponents that bias election results in favor of the incumbent: (1) pre-electoral election violence (0-3), (2) election-day electoral violence (0-3), (3) pre-electoral election cheating (0-3), (4) election-day election cheating (0-3) and (5) restrictions on electoral participation and electoral law (0-3). 0 indicates no fraud, whereas 3 represents for serious fraud. To measure the dictator's power of mobilization, the first model is based largely on Higashijima (2013), which is described below in detail. In addition to a series of variables measuring mobilization power, I also include other variables that are seen as relevant in the study of electoral manipulation. I then calculate the gap between predicted values in this first-stage model and real values of electoral fraud. In the second stage, I regress this gap variable (predicted values – real values) and other relevant controls on the two dependent variables—leadership turnover and popular protests. Capturing this gap enables us to see how well dictators match the level of electoral fraud with his power of mobilization. In other words, adopting this two-stage estimation, we can empirically assess how successfully the electoral dilemma is resolved. If the gap variable takes more positive values, then it suggests that the dictator manipulates elections more blatantly than he needs. My theoretical expectation is that excessively manipulated elections should be associated with a higher probability of popular protests, while having a lower likelihood of political turnover. When the variable takes more negative values elections are excessively transparent in light of the autocrat's strength. Therefore, I expect that political turnover is more likely to follow such elections.

[Figure 1 about here]

The First Model Specification: A Mobilization Model

As I explained above, the dependent variable of the first model is electoral fraud. To measure the main explanatory factor, the autocrat's power to mobilize popular support, I focus on two factors (Higashijima 2013). The first is to what extent autocrats possess the ability to efficiently distribute economic favors to a wide range of citizens. To do so, they need to have (1) substantial financial resources and (2) strong political organizations to discipline ruling elites (and hence streamline economic distribution). As discussed before, the importance of financial resources to buy popular support has been established by previous studies. Without abundant public resources, autocrats cannot

buy off popular support through public goods provision to a sufficient extent (see, e.g., Ross 2001; Morrison 2009). To make economic distribution to the citizenry efficient, disciplinary organizations are also necessary because such organizations can deter ruling elites from engaging in exploiting state resources. To measure the financial resources that autocrats control, I use Ross' (2011) oil-gas value per capita in constant 2000 dollars. This variable is calculated by multiplying a country's total oil and gas production by the current oil and gas price and then dividing this amount by the total population. The oil-gas value per capita variable is interacted with (1) a dominant-party regime dummy (Geddes et al. [2014]) and (2) the size and cohesiveness of politically dominant ethnic groups^{iv} (from Cederman et al.'s [2009] *Ethnic Power Relations Dataset*). Making long lasting power-sharing possible between the autocrat and ruling elites (Magaloni 2008; Svobik 2012) and thus preventing ruling elites' myopic appropriation of state resources, dominant-party regimes contribute to reducing the need for election fraud by increasing the efficiency of economic distribution. Coherent, large politically dominant ethnic groups^v make it easier for the autocrat to monitor ruling elites' behavior (Fearon and Laitin 1995) while facilitating public goods provision to a large portion of citizens (e.g. Alesina et al. 1999; Habyarimana et al. 2007). Thus, such dominant ethnic groups help dictators streamline economic distribution. I expect the negative impact of natural resource wealth on electoral fraud will be magnified when authoritarian regimes have dominant parties and/or less fractionalized, large dominant ethnic groups.

A second way to measure an autocrat's mobilization power is the extent to which clear opposition exists. In authoritarian regimes, challenging an autocrat is an extremely costly political behavior because in most cases anti-regime protests are brutally repressed (Davenport 2007). On the flip side, once initiated, this costly action would result in credibly showing the authoritarian leader that a considerable number of people are unsatisfied with the regime and strong opposition does exist at both national and local levels (e.g. Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change during the 2000s) (Kuran 1991; Krichelli et al. 2010; Weiss 2012). To measure anti-government collective action, I follow the previous literature like Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Howard and Roessler (2006: 372) and use indicators counting the number of demonstrations, riots, and strikes from Arthur Banks' (2010) *Cross-National-Time-Series Data Archive*. Summing the total numbers of these three collective actions, it turned out that the mean was just 1. Therefore, if the country experienced at least one riot, demonstration, or strike at (t-1) year, then the variable is coded as 1, otherwise 0.

Besides these variables measuring the autocrat's power of mobilization, I also add control variable: political competitiveness (measured by Polity IV), election administrative capacity (using Kelley's (2012) QOE), logged GDP per capita (using World Development Indicators [WDI] and Maddison 2011), GDP growth (WDI), trade openness (measured by sum of exports and imports relative to GDP, using Penn World Tables), rural population (WDI), type of election (presidential vs parliamentary elections, Kelley 2012), the presence of domestic and international election monitoring (Kelley 2012), and decade dummies.

[Table 1 about here]

In Table 1, I show statistical results of the first stage model. As I expected, the oil-gas value is negatively associated with electoral fraud when autocrats have dominant parties or more coherent, larger dominant ethnic groups. The collective action variable is positively correlated with the level of electoral fraud. These results suggest that stronger dictators with mobilization power tend to refrain from using a series of manipulation techniques. R-squared is 0.446, suggesting that the first model explains more than 40 percent of total variations in electoral fraud. Based on this result, I compute predicted values of electoral fraud, which is showed in Appendix B.

The Second Model Specification: Models of Leadership Turnover and Popular Protests

[Figure 1 about here]

To measure the dependent variable for the Hypothesis 1, **leadership turnover**, I use a variable capturing broadly defined post-electoral leadership turnover from Hyde and Marinov (2012). This variable is coded as 1 if the incumbent leader is replaced after the election, 0 otherwise (NELDA39). It includes all types of post-election leadership change including turnover brought by hereditary successions and nomination of the next leader by the current ruler before an election. As these types of leadership change do not relate to an incumbent's electoral performance, I remove them from the sample by referring to another variable (NELDA23). This variable captures if a successor assumes power after elections. I also found nine additional cases where leadership change occurred because of pre-electoral successions within ruling parties— rather than turnover as consequences of election results. I excluded these cases and rerun the model to check the robustness of empirical results.^{vi} Further, in both models, I do not include cases that experienced political turnover as a result of large-scale popular protests because these political turnover cases are not driven by election results but by protests (e.g. the 2003 Georgian election and the 2000 election in Côte d'Ivoire).

My second dependent variable, **popular protests**, is measured using the NELDA dataset. NELDA includes a variable indicating whether there were riots and protests after the election (NELDA29). If either riots or protests occur after the election, then the variable is coded as 1. As a robustness check, another variable including only riots and protests over electoral fraud is also used (NELDA30).

I can calculate an election fraud gap using predicted values from model calculating the difference between predicted and real values of fraud (predicted values – real values). Figure 1 shows the distribution of the gap. Using the gap variable as the main independent variable, I estimate probit models to empirically test my theoretical expectations. My empirical tests consist of two parts—a protest model and a turnover model. Regarding controls, I included the same set of control variables for the protest

and turnover models.^{vii} I added political competition (t-1 year lagged, measured by Polity IV), GDP per capita (t-1 year lagged, WDI and Maddison 2011), economic growth (t-1 year lagged, WDI), trade openness (measured by Penn World Tables), rural population (WDI), types of elections (from Kelley 2012, presidential vs. parliamentary elections), presence of domestic and international election monitoring (Kelley 2012), election administrative capacity (Kelley 2012), election boycotts (Hyde and Marinov 2012), military spending (t-1 year lagged, Correlates of War Project), leader's age (Goemans et al. 2009), leader's tenure length (Goemans et al. 2009), logged population (t-1 year lagged, WDI) and violent conflict incidence (t-1 year lagged, from PRIO's *Armed Conflict Dataset*, Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). I also controlled for regional and time specific heterogeneities by employing regional and decade dummies. To deal with possible temporal dependence, duration of peace years and three cubic splines are also included in all models (Beck et al. 1998).

Results

[Table 2 and Figure 2 about here]

Table 2 reports results of the probit analysis. In Model 1 where the dependent variable is political turnover, the fraud gap is statistically significantly negative at the .01 level. This suggests that if autocrats fail to increase the level of electoral fraud despite their need to do so, they are more likely to experience political turnover after elections. Model 2 limits the sample by excluding the nine cases where political turnover was driven by pre-electoral leadership succession, and the fraud gap variable has the same negative and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of post-electoral turnover. Based on Model 1, Figure 2-(a) graphically illustrates how a predicted probability of turnover changes as the fraud gap variable increases. When the gap variable takes the value of more than 0, the predicted probability is not distinguishable from 0. Yet, when the variable becomes more negative (between -1 and -7), the probability of turnover exponentially increases in a statistically significant way. When the variable is -1, the probability of turnover is no more than 3%, whereas the probability increases to 55% when the gap variable is -7. These results support Hypothesis 1. Closely looking at the data, countries such as Sri Lanka (1977), Bolivia (1980), Honduras (1981), Guatemala (1982), Uruguay (1984), Zambia (1991), Azerbaijan (1992), Haiti (1995, 2000), Liberia (1997), and Niger (1999) underused electoral fraud in their elections, resulting in political turnover.

Then, Models 3 and 4 estimate the fraud gap's impact on the likelihood of popular protests. In Model 3, the fraud gap has a positive coefficient, which is statistically significant at the .01 level, meaning that when elections are more exposed to excessive electoral manipulation relative to dictators' mobilization power, they are more likely to face protesters in the aftermath of elections. In Model 4 where I focus only on protests clearly over the government's electoral fraud, a similar, positive and significant effect of fraud gap is confirmed. Using estimation results of Model 3, Figure 2-[b] shows how the

probability of protests will change with the values of fraud gap. When the gap variable is negative between -7 and -4, its impact is not distinguishable from 0. Yet, as the variable gets more positive and bigger, the impact of the fraud gap also tends to increase. For instance, when the gap variable is 0, the probability of protests is no more than 10%, whereas when the gap variable is 7, the probability rises up to 60%. Some examples in which overused electoral manipulation induced post-electoral protests include Haiti (1984), Senegal (1988), Kenya (1992, 1997), Mauritania (1992), Cameroon (1992), Togo (1994), Indonesia (1997), Algeria (1999), and Côte d'Ivoire (2000).

Robustness Checks

To make sure the extent to which the results are robust, I conducted the following four robustness checks.^{viii} First, I included variables like leader's age, leader's tenure and a lagged dependent variable (the level of electoral fraud in the previous election) in the first model to take into account possible serial correlations as well as the fact that autocrats' calculation over electoral fraud will be influenced by their tenures and ages. Second, I used two alternative datasets, Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012) and Polity IV, to identify authoritarian countries and reran all the models using new samples of authoritarian countries.^{ix} Third, one may think that the results in the second-stage model might be unstable depending on model specifications of the first model. To minimize this concern, I alternatively used the electoral fraud variable per se as a main independent variable and I regressed it on the dependent variables with the same sets of controls.^x Finally, I tried every possible combination of control variables in the second models to see if results may change according to model specifications in the second stage estimation. As a result of these robustness checks, I found that most results were vertically the same as the ones that I reported above, except for the following two. First, probit regression in one turnover model did not compute standard errors because variations are perfectly explained by the independent variables included.^{xi} Second, in a sample filtered by Polity IV, the fraud gap variable in a turnover model did not reach to a 10% statistical significance level. Yet, other than these two exceptions, all the additional analyses confirmed the robustness of the results.

Conclusion

This chapter explores the conditions under which elections contribute to political conflict in authoritarianism—specifically leadership turnover and popular protests. Pointing to the fact that authoritarian leaders face a trade-off between the certainty of winning an overwhelming majority and the credibility of election results, I argue that when autocrats fail to match their electoral fraud to their de facto power balance with political elites, elections are more likely to be followed by political conflict. A cross-national statistical analysis of 72 authoritarian countries from 1975 to 2004 rendered empirical support for my theoretical predictions. The theory and empirical analysis of this chapter suggest that elections are a double-edged sword for authoritarian leaders:

Elections may provide a good chance for autocrats to improve information shortage inherent in authoritarian regimes, yet the failure of choosing an appropriate level of fraud backfires on authoritarian leaders themselves. Recognizing this election paradox and preventing autocrats from flexibly manipulating elections via international pressures and foreign policies, the international community and domestic opposition may be able to transform authoritarian elections into the window of opportunity to achieve democratization.

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Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Histogram of Gap in Electoral Fraud under Dictatorship




Table 1: The First-Stage Model Predicting Electoral Fraud

Dependent variable	Fraud
Oil-Gas value percapita (hundred dollars)	0.025 (0.02)
Collective Action (t-1) year	0.929** (0.417)
Party	-0.259 (0.419)
Party X Oil-Gas	-0.04*** (0.013)
Ethnic Organizational Power	0.652 (0.854)
Ethnic Power X Oil-Gas	-0.176* (0.101)
Polity IV	-0.303*** (0.039)
Election Adminisrative Capacity	0.25 (0.208)
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) year	-0.16 (0.430)
Economic Growth (t-1) year	-0.029 (0.027)
Trade (t-1) year	-0.006 (0.005)
Rural Population (t-1) year	0.009 (0.019)
Parliamentary Elections	-0.263 (0.266)
Domestic Election Monitoring	0.183 (0.636)
International Election Monitoring	0.874 (0.529)
1980s	0.571 (0.650)
1990s	2.513*** (0.733)
2000s	3.324*** (0.792)
Constant	3.618 (4.217)
Observations	255
F-value	15.65***
R-squared	0.446

Note: Decade dummies are included. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.


Table 2: Probit Analysis of Post-Electoral Turnover and Protests in Dictatorship

Dependent Variable	Model 1 Turnover	Model 2 Turnover	Model 3 Protests	Model 4 Protests (over fraud)
Fraud Gap	-0.328*** (0.08)	-1.277*** (0.43)	0.219*** (0.05)	0.224*** (0.05)
Duration of Peace Year	-0.401** (0.20)	-2.904** (1.43)	-0.349*** (0.13)	-0.211* (0.13)
Polity IV (t-1) year	0.217*** (0.044)	1.712** (0.750)	-0.0678** (0.034)	-0.132*** (0.041)
Logged GDP percapita (t-1) year	-0.286 (0.373)	-0.103 (0.561)	0.576** (0.262)	0.675** (0.266)
Economic Growth (t-1) year	0.0604*** (0.023)	0.332** (0.151)	0.0092 (0.013)	0.0207 (0.013)
Trade (t-1) year	-0.0301*** (0.009)	-0.441** (0.193)	0.0021 (0.005)	0.00293 (0.006)
Rural Population (t-1) year	0.0344** (0.013)	0.428** (0.190)	0.0209** (0.010)	0.0103 (0.010)
Parliamentary Elections	-0.605* (0.353)	-0.81 (0.587)	0.00855 (0.216)	-0.0249 (0.234)
Domestic Election Monitoring	1.654*** (0.443)	14.14** (5.664)	-0.18 (0.312)	-0.0096 (0.335)
International Election Monitoring	1.022** (0.410)	4.617*** (1.438)	0.827*** (0.266)	0.903*** (0.315)
Election Administrative Capacity	-0.750*** (0.226)	-8.885** (3.655)	0.14 (0.110)	0.135 (0.113)
Election Boycott	-0.609 (0.394)	-5.872** (2.341)	0.663** (0.264)	0.560** (0.261)
Military Spending (t-1) year	0.002 (0.052)	-0.0588 (0.166)	0.0378 (0.029)	0.0126 (0.037)
Leader Age	0.0237 (0.019)	-0.112* (0.058)	0.00355 (0.015)	-0.00956 (0.016)
Leader Tenure	-0.002 (0.019)	-0.0734 (0.060)	-0.0246 (0.017)	-0.0406** (0.017)
Logged Population (t-1) year	-0.539*** (0.207)	-8.233** (3.373)	0.243* (0.136)	0.227 (0.139)
Violent Conflict Incident (t-1) year	-0.077	-1.703	-0.398	-0.257

	(0.475)	(1.449)	(0.288)	(0.307)
Constant	6.886	121.9**	-12.43***	-15.88***
	(4.653)	(49.24)	(4.027)	(4.351)
Observations	214	205	268	271
Log Pseudolikelihood	-40.65	-17.05	-85.19	-72.47
Pseudo R Squared	0.6261	0.8179	0.2976	0.3291
Wald Chi2	103.62***	51.16***	76.72***	993.93***

Note: Decade dummies, regional dummies and three cubic splines are all included in the models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Turnover and Protests




Note: Shaded areas are 90% confidence interval. The graph (a) and (b) are based on Models 1 and 3, respectively.

Appendix

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

	Num of Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Popular protests (NELDA 29)	526	0.19	0.39	0	1
Popular Protests over Fraud (NELDA 30)	531	0.15	0.35	0	1
Leadership Turnover (NELDA 39)	436	0.18	0.38	0	1
Electoral Fraud	366	5.37	2.94	0	15
Fraud Gap	301	-0.27	2.3	-6.51	6.96
Oil-Gas Value per capita	565	3.38	14.23	0	206.27
Ethnic Organizational Power	516	0.38	0.3	0	0.98
Dominant Party Regime	538	0.5	0.5	0	1
Collective Action	590	0.26	0.44	0	1
Polity IV	574	-3.3	5.04	-10	10
Election Administrative Capacity	470	0.65	1.13	0	5
Logged GDP per capita	553	7.54	0.85	6.07	10.02
Economic Growth	570	2.71	7.37	-28.09	63.37
Trade Openness (% of GDP)	545	72.66	51.87	8.79	376.28
Rural Population (% of Total Population)	544	58.25	20.89	0	95.72
Parliamentary Elections	590	0.67	0.46	0	1
Domestic Election Monitoring	586	0.16	0.37	0	1
International Election Monitoring	585	0.35	0.47	0	1
Years passed since the last protest	526	5.31	6.58	0	27
Years passed since the last turnover	436	5.56	6.67	0	27
Opposition Boycott (NELDA 14)	491	0.28	0.45	0	1
Military Spending (% of GDP)	517	2.43	3.55	0	42.41
Leader's Age	557	57.57	10.95	19	86
Leader's Tenure	557	10.31	8.83	0	45
Logged Total Population	567	15.82	1.43	12.03	19.09
Violent Incident	567	0.2	0.4	0	1

Appendix B: Histogram of Predicted Values of Electoral Fraud



Appendix C: Data Sources

Banks, Arthur. 2010. *The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Brian Min and Andreas Wimmer. 2009. *Ethnic Power Relations Dataset*. Available at <http://www.epr.ucla.edu/>. (accessed on May 24, 2013)

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Maddison, Angus. 2011. *The Maddison Project Database*. Available at <http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm>. (accesses on May 24, 2013)

Marshall, Monty and Keith Jagger, *Polity IV Project*.
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Ross, Michael. 2011. *Oil and Gas Production and Values, 1932-2009*. Available at <http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlross>. (accessed on May 24, 2013)

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ⁱⁱ Following Svobik (2012), I define an authoritarian regime as “an independent country that fails to satisfy at least one of the following two criteria for democracy: (1) free and competitive legislative elections and (2) an executive that is elected either directly in free and competitive presidential elections or indirectly by a legislature in parliamentary systems” (Svobik 2012, 22). I use the terms autocracy and authoritarian regime interchangeably and refer to the heads of these countries’ governments as autocrats and authoritarian leaders.

ⁱⁱⁱ Data range in time from 1975 to 2004 and is compiled using Hyde and Marinov’s (2012) *National Elections in Democracy and Autocracy* (NELDA) and Kelley’s (2012) *Quality of Elections* (QOE).

^{iv} This variable is measured multiplying fractionalization index of politically dominant ethnic groups by the proportion of the dominant groups relative to total population.

^v Here politically dominant ethnic groups refer to ethnic groups that have access to political posts at the executive level in the country.

^{vi} The nine cases are the Tanzania 1995 elections (both parliamentary and presidential), the Algerian 1999 elections (presidential), the Mozambique 2004 elections (both parliamentary and presidential), the Namibia 2004 elections (both parliamentary and presidential), and the Zambia 2001 elections (both parliamentary and presidential).

^{vii} Even if I try every different combination of controls in both models, main results did not change.

^{viii} Although I am unable to show results in the paper because of space constraint, they are available from the author upon request.

^{ix} Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012) are an alternative, binary measure of political regimes (democracy vs. non-democracies) covering 1800-2007. Regarding Polity IV (which ranges from -10 and 10), I used a conventional threshold of Polity2 score = 6 to empirically identify non-democracies. If a country’s Polity2 score is less than 6, then the country is seen as an authoritarian country. As Polity2 score is covering countries that are exposed to civil war, we are able to avoid possible bias in estimation that we might have by using Cheibub et al. (2010)’s binary measure, which excludes countries under civil war.

^x From the theoretical point of view, using the electoral fraud variable per se does not necessarily represent the idea of the “fraud gap.” However, a correlation between the fraud gap and the electoral fraud variable is very high, 0.80.

^{xi} This happened when I included a lagged dependent variable, which ended up dropping many observations (about 40% of observations) from the first model and thus could not have enough observations in the second model.